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Abstract: This article examines the role of coercion in 
grounding a prima facie duty to obey the positive law. 
I argue that there is at least a weak prima facie duty to 
obey the positive law in a minimally effective and just legal 
system. The fact that a norm holds positive legal status 
within a minimally effective and just legal system gives 
people presumptive reason to believe that the norm is a 
salient and reasonable means of social coordination and 
therefore that they have pro tanto reason to follow it. Co-
ercive sanctions may bolster the salience of social norms 
by giving people incentive to follow them. They also make 
it more likely that an agent’s decision to follow a particular 
norm will be reasonable, by creating the prospect that the 
reasons supplied by the sanctions will override any deficits 
in the salience or reasonableness of the norm itself. A le-
gal system with strong coercive enforcement is therefore 
more likely than a less coercive system (other things being 
equal) to present its subjects with both prima facie and pro 
tanto moral obligations. This reliance on coercion, how-
ever, carries a significant moral hazard, since it may boot-
strap inefficient or unreasonable norms into a position of 
epistemological and moral weight.
Keywords: legal obligation, legal authority, prima facie 
duty, claims of law, coordination, coercion, punishment, 
sanctions.
Resumen: Este artículo examina el papel de la coerción 
en la fundamentación de un deber prima facie de obede-
cer la ley positiva. Sostengo que hay al menos un deber 
prima facie débil de obedecer la ley positiva en un sistema 
legal mínimamente efectivo y justo. El hecho de que una 
norma tenga un estatus legal positivo dentro de un sis-
tema legal mínimamente efectivo y justo le da a las per-
sonas una razón presunta para creer que la norma es un 
medio fundamental y razonable de coordinación social y, 
por lo mismo, tienen una razón pro tanto para seguirla. 
Las sanciones coercitivas pueden reforzar la prominen-
cia de las normas sociales al incentivar a las personas a 
seguirlas. También hacen que sea más probable que la 
decisión de un agente de seguir una norma particular sea 
razonable, al crear la posibilidad de que las razones pro-
porcionadas por las sanciones anulen cualquier déficit en 
la notoriedad o razonabilidad de la propia norma.  Por ello, 
un sistema legal con una sólida capacidad coercitiva tiene 
(en igualdad de condiciones) más probabilidades de pre-
sentar a sus ciudadanos tanto obligaciones morales prima 
facie, como obligaciones morales pro tanto. Sin embargo, 
esta dependencia de la coerción conlleva un riesgo moral 
significativo, ya que puede dotar a las normas ineficientes 
o irrazonables de peso epistemológico y moral.
Palabras clave: obligación legal, autoridad legal, deber 
prima facie, pretensiones legales, coordinación, coerción, 
castigo, sanciones.
* This article draws on arguments developed in Crowe, J., Natural Law and the Nature of Law, 
Cambridge University Press, 2019, ch 10.
I. IntroduCtIon
T his article examines the role of coercion in grounding a prima facie duty to obey the positive law. I argue that there is at least a weak prima facie duty to obey the positive law in a minimally effective and just legal 
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system. The notion of a prima facie duty is understood here in an epistemo-
logical sense. If A has a prima facie duty to perform some action f, then A has 
presumptive reason to believe that A has decisive reason to f. I argue that the fact 
that an action is required by law in a system of the kind described above crea-
tes presumptive reason to believe that the action is rationally required. Law, 
on this view, does not possess generic moral force, but it does have epistemo-
logical salience as a guide to action.
The foundation for this view is supplied by the idea that each person has 
pro tanto reason to follow salient social norms where these represent reason-
able modes of pursuing the common good of her community. I claim that the 
fact that a norm holds positive legal status within a minimally effective and 
just legal system gives people presumptive reason to believe that the norm is 
a salient and reasonable means of social coordination. It therefore generates a 
prima facie duty of the kind described above. The strength of this prima facie 
duty will depend upon the features of the law or legal system in question. The 
duty will tend to be more robust where the norms in question are backed by 
coercive sanctions.
Coercive sanctions may bolster the salience of social norms by giving 
people incentive to follow them. They also make it more likely that an agent’s 
decision to follow a particular norm will be reasonable, by creating the pros-
pect that the reasons supplied by the sanctions will override any deficits in the 
salience or reasonableness of the norm itself. These effects might obtain on 
the level of particular norms or on a system-wide basis. A legal system with 
strong coercive enforcement is more likely than a less coercive system (other 
things being equal) to present its subjects with both prima facie and pro tanto 
moral obligations to obey its edicts. This reliance on coercion, however, car-
ries a significant moral hazard, since it may bootstrap inefficient or unreason-
able norms into a position of epistemological and moral weight.
II. the ClaIms of law
Joseph Raz argues that ‘it is an essential feature of law that it claims le-
gitimate authority.’ 1 This thesis raises two further questions. First, how is it 
possible that law presents claims? Second, what is the content of the claims in 
1 raz, J, The Authority of Law, Clarendon Press, 1979, 30. 
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question? The proposition that law presents claims to authority may at first 
appear puzzling. Law does not seem to be the right kind of thing to make 
claims. Critics of Raz’s analysis, such as Ronald Dworkin, 2 have accused him 
of anthropomorphism: humans may make claims, but law cannot. A plausible 
response to this challenge, however, is to emphasise the role of legal officials 
in imparting social significance to legal artifacts. 3 Legal officials portray the 
law as authoritative; in this way, they make claims about law. The thesis that 
‘law claims authority’ can be taken as shorthand for ‘legal officials claim that 
law has authority’. There is nothing puzzling about that.
There may be another way of explaining how law presents claims. This 
alternative explanation would treat the enactment of a legal rule, not merely 
as a formal process leading to the production of a particular type of artifact, 
but also as a form of speech act. We might say that, in enacting a legal rule (or 
positing a legal norm), a legal official or body both (a) creates a legal artifact 
and (b) performs the speech act of making a legal claim. 4 On this view, the 
claims of law are understood as claims made by legal officials in the act of legal 
enactment. We might usefully analyse the claim conveyed in legal enactment 
as including both a particular and a general component. The particular claim is 
that the specific rule expressed in the enactment confers an obligation. How-
ever, this claim, considered alone, invites a further question: by virtue of what 
authority does the claimed obligation arise? This question is pre-empted by 
the general claim: law has generic authority. 5
The idea that the claims of law are made by legal officials on law’s behalf 
goes some way towards vindicating Raz’s proposal that law necessarily claims 
authority. However, it runs into difficulties in relation to forms of law that do 
not necessarily rely upon legal officials. 6 A partial solution to this problem can 
be found in the idea that members of the community talk and think about law 
as having authority. The claims of law, then, might come partly from legal 
officials and partly from ordinary members of the community. People often 
2 dworkIn, R, Justice in Robes, Harvard University Press, 2006, ch 6-7; Id., ‘Response’, in S her-
shovItz (ed.), Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin, Oxford University 
Press, 2006, 306-7.
3 Compare Gardner, J, ‘Law’s Aim in Law’s Empire’, in S hershovItz (ed.), Exploring Law’s 
Empire..., op. cit., Oxford University Press, 2006, 213.
4 Compare reInaCh, A, ‘The A Priori Foundations of the Civil Law’, trans John F Crosby, 
Aletheia 3, 1 (1983) 104-5.
5 Compare stewart, I, ‘The Use of Law’, Current Legal Issues 8 (2005) 259.
6 For discussion, see Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 6.
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talk and think about law as if they have reason to do as the law requires, simply 
because it is the law; in doing so, they can be interpreted as making claims to 
generic authority on the law’s behalf.
We have focused so far on what it means for law to claim authority. We 
can now turn to the content of this claim: what does it mean for law to claim 
authority? Raz offers a detailed and influential theory of authority: he calls it 
the service conception, because it attempts to explain how an authority assists or 
serves those to whom it applies. 7 Raz argues that the function of an authority 
is to help people act on the reasons that bind them. It is meant to simplify the 
process of deciding how to act. People normally work out how they ought to 
behave by weighing up the reasons they have to act in different ways. For ex-
ample, they may have reasons both for and against following a particular rule. 
A putative authority can only make a difference to people’s decision-making 
processes if they do not have to weigh up whether to comply with it in each 
individual case. Otherwise, they will still have to consider all the relevant rea-
sons and the authority will fail to serve its purpose.
Raz concludes that an authority only serves those whom it governs if 
it does more than provide reasons to act in a particular way. He therefore 
explains authority in terms of what he calls exclusionary reasons. 8 An exclusion-
ary reason is a reason to exclude or refrain from acting upon other relevant 
reasons. That is, it pre-emptively removes from the picture some of the rea-
sons that people would otherwise have to consider in deciding how to act. An 
exclusionary reason ‘is immune from the claim that it should be re-examined 
with a view to possible revision on every occasion to which it applies.’ 9 A gen-
uine authority, Raz contends, will simplify the reasoning process by providing 
both positive reasons for acting in a particular way and exclusionary reasons to 
disregard other competing reasons.
Raz, then, argues that law claims to provide exclusionary reasons. Law’s 
claim to authority is not simply a claim that law supplies reasons. Rather, it is a 
claim that law pre-empts other normative factors. Law claims to dictate action 
within its sphere of application. It is assumed that people are not entitled to 
depart from the law unless it provides for its own exception: ‘what is excluded 
by a rule of law is not all other reasons, but merely all those other reasons 
7 raz, J, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1988, 56.
8 Id., Practical Reason and Norms, Oxford University Press, 1999, 35-48.
9 Id., The Authority of Law, 33.
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which are themselves not legally recognised.’ 10 Furthermore, law claims le-
gitimate authority, as opposed to merely effective or de facto authority. 11 Law 
does not claim that we should follow it based on force or threats alone. Rather, 
law claims that the authority it enjoys is well founded. It asserts a kind of mor-
al authority over its subjects.
Other theorists have contested Raz’s thesis that law claims legitimate au-
thority. Mark Murphy, for example, argues that Raz gives us no reason to 
accept his thesis that law claims authority, as opposed to the weaker thesis 
that law is committed to the claim that it is backed by decisive reasons for ac-
tion. 12 Raz supports his view by reference to a range of characteristics of legal 
institutions, such as the way that judges and legislators formulate the demands 
of law. However, Murphy denies that Raz’s description of these factors gives 
reason to adopt the Raz thesis over Murphy’s weaker proposal. It is true that 
some of Raz’s points in support of his thesis are equally consistent with Mur-
phy’s proposal. However, there are other points in support of Raz’s position 
that Murphy does not mention. One relevant consideration is the way law is 
often presented as a self-contained normative system. This point, which is cer-
tainly noticed by Raz, 13 comes to the forefront in the work of Hans Kelsen.
Kelsen depicts legal validity as deriving from a necessarily presupposed 
basic norm [Grundnorm]; the basic norm gives other norms in the legal order 
decisive force. Kelsen therefore maintains that law is a self-contained nor-
mative system, in the sense that it excludes the need to consult extra-legal 
principles in working out what one ought (legally) to do. 14 Legal officials 
often seem to present the law as if this were true. Legal directives are typi-
cally presented not only as if they are backed by reasons for compliance, but 
also as if those reasons may be located without looking outside the law. The 
only reasons considered admissible in courtroom argument, for example, are 
those from within the law; if a norm has not been adopted as part of the law, 
it is generally treated as irrelevant. Courts typically only justify their rul-
ings through legal arguments; they do not typically support their decisions 
with extra-legal reasons. Statutes likewise lay down rules of conduct and 
10 Ibidem. 
11 Ibid., 28-30.
12 murphy, M C, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2006, 52-6.
13 raz, Practical Reason and Norms, 170-7.
14 Compare kelsen, H, General Theory of Law and State, trans Anders Wedberg, Russell and Rus-
sell, 1961, 373-6, 407-10. 
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prescribe penalties in an authoritative tone without referring to extra-legal 
sources of obligation.
Raz’s claim, then, seems plausible if one focuses on the way law is pre-
sented by legal officials. However, I am not sure whether the same applies 
to those forms of law where legal officials do not play a central role. I have 
argued elsewhere that law’s function as an artifact is to serve as a deontic 
marker by creating a general sense of social obligation. 15 This analysis is 
consistent with the idea that law claims authority, but it is also consistent 
with the weaker proposal that law claims to present decisive or weighty rea-
sons for action. I doubt whether popular discourse around law is sufficiently 
clear or univocal to adjudicate between these proposals. It therefore seems 
to be going too far to say, as Raz does, that law necessarily claims authority. 
It does, however, seem to be a common and perhaps characteristic feature of 
law that it claims to function as a self-contained genre of discourse: that is, 
it claims to remove the need to look outside it when working out what one 
ought to do.
It is, of course, a different question whether law’s claims to authority are 
well-founded. Raz argues they are not. He contends that while law claims to 
have legitimate authority, this claim is misleading. 16 There may be good rea-
sons to obey particular laws under many circumstances, but there is no generic 
obligation to obey the law as a whole. Raz observes that people have moral 
reasons to obey laws prohibiting murder, rape and so on. It is also common for 
people to have prudential reasons to obey the law, due to the risk of legal and 
social sanctions. However, he denies that everyone has good reason to obey 
the law all of the time. Indeed, he argues there is not even a prima facie ob-
ligation to obey the law. Many legal violations involve no moral wrongdoing 
and little or no risk of being caught and subjected to sanctions. In such cases, 
whether to obey is an open question. Raz, then, denies that we can meaning-
fully assess legal validity by reference to whether law actually possesses legit-
imate authority. The fact that law claims legitimate authority is sufficient to 
explain the central position it occupies in social life. People typically take it 
for granted that law has genuine authority, but this popular view rests on an 
15 Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 9.
16 raz, The Authority of Law, ch 12. For other influential arguments along these lines, see sIm-
mons, A J, Moral Principles and Political Obligations, Princeton University Press, 1979; Green, 
L, The Authority of the State (Oxford University Press, 1990); smIth, M B E, ‘Is There a Prima 
Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?’, Yale Law Journal 82 (1973) 950.
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uncritical acceptance of law’s claims. Raz therefore presents what we might 
describe as an error theory of law: 17 law is generally taken to have authority, but 
this assumption is false.
III. law and CoordInatIon
John Finnis rejects Raz’s view that law lacks genuine authority. 18 He con-
tends that law possesses presumptive authority due to its role in facilitating so-
cial coordination. Finnis begins his argument from the observation that ‘what 
is instrumental in securing a morally obligatory goal must itself be morally 
obligatory, unless there is some other instrumentality, equally or more ser-
viceable.’ 19 He goes on to argue that law is instrumental to the morally bene-
ficial goal of social cooperation in service of the common good. Furthermore, 
law has advantages over other ways of achieving that goal. Law therefore has 
presumptive moral force. Finnis’s coordination argument for legal authority 
has been strongly criticised for misapplying the concept of a coordination 
problem as used in game theory. 20 Finnis’s response is to deny that he ever 
intended to rely on the game theoretical concept of a coordination problem. 21 
Rather, he relies on a less technical argument that the law, taken as a whole, is 
a salient method of securing morally beneficial social cooperation.
Finnis’s argument for legal authority fails. The central problem with the 
argument can be summarised as follows. Finnis seeks to establish that the law 
possesses generic authority as a specification of the duty to do one’s share for 
the common good. It is true that some laws play a morally beneficial role in 
securing social coordination. However, others do not. Some laws are unnec-
essary for the common good: society would get on just as well without them. 
Other laws are harmful to social coordination: they may be well intentioned, 
but they are poorly planned, wasteful or unjust and therefore end up making 
17 Compare maCkIe, J L, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, Penguin, 1977.
18 fInnIs, J, ‘Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament’, in Philosophy of Law: Collected 
Essays Volume IV, Oxford University Press, 2011.
19 Ibid., 48.
20 See, for example, Green, L, ‘Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good’, Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 3 (1983) 299. 
21 fInnIs, ‘Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament’; Id., ‘Law as Coordination’, in Phi-
losophy of Law: Collected Essays Volume IV, Oxford University Press, 2011.
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things worse. Why, then, should we think that appeals to coordination yield 
a generic obligation to obey the positive law, rather than simply an obligation 
to obey any individual laws that actually succeed in advancing society’s pursuit 
of the common good?
Finnis’s response to this challenge seems to lie in his appeals to the spe-
cial features of law that make the legal system, as a whole, a particularly salient 
mode of social coordination. He appeals to the idea that ‘law presents itself 
as a seamless web’, 22 in the sense that it forbids its subjects from picking and 
choosing between legal rules. However, just because law claims to be gener-
ically binding does not mean the claim is true. People have the option of 
picking and choosing among legal rules – and regularly do so – however much 
legal officials try to dissuade them. Furthermore, this type of selective legal 
obedience does not necessarily harm the common good. I noted above that 
some laws are socially harmful: they divert social efforts to pursue the com-
mon good away from more productive approaches. The common good would 
be better served in such cases if people ignored those laws in favour of other 
salient norms. Indeed, this is exactly what people often do.
Consider, for example, the following case:
Thomas Street: A local statute prescribes a speed limit on Thomas Street 
of 50 kilometres per hour (km/h). This speed limit is advertised by signs 
posted along the road. However, in practice, almost everyone drives on 
Thomas Street at a speed of 70 km/h.
What is the best approach for motorists to take when driving on Thomas 
Street? Should they stick to the advertised speed limit or keep up with the flow 
of traffic? Other things being equal, the most reasonable course of action may 
well be to drive at the faster speed, since it is generally safer to drive at the 
same speed as other road users. 23 In other words, drivers on Thomas Street 
will fare better by disregarding the statutory speed limit in favour of the speed 
adopted by other drivers, than they would by regarding the traffic regulations 
as a seamless web. Situations of this kind are a common part of social life. 
Motorists confronted with a choice between the advertised speed limit and 
the speed dictated by social convention will often opt for the latter. This will 
22 Id., ‘Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament’, 50; Id., ‘Law as Coordination’, 71.
23 I assume there are no other features of the road that make it clearly unsafe to drive at 70 km/h.
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frequently be the best choice for a motorist who wishes to do her share for the 
common good by promoting safety on the road.
The Thomas Street scenario involves a coordination problem. There 
is a range of possible (and safe) speeds that traffic on Thomas Street may 
travel; each person on the road is better off if the others travel at the same 
speed, but it does not matter (within the confines of safety) what speed it 
is. In other words, there is an aspect of the common good in this scenario 
that requires determination. As it happens, statute law prescribes a particular 
speed for travelling on Thomas Street; however, in the circumstances, that 
solution fails to be salient. The salient solution is to travel at 70 km/h, there-
by breaking the law. A similar example is discussed by David Lewis in his 
classic study on convention. Lewis notes that the decision whether to drive 
on the right, or left-hand side of the road presents a coordination problem. 
Reasonable people will drive on the side that they expect other road-users to 
drive on. However, as Lewis explains, this type of case involves an additional 
complication:
If we do not drive on the right [in the United States], the highway patrol 
will catch us and we will be punished. So we have an independent incentive 
to drive on the right, and this second incentive is independent of how others 
drive. But it makes no important difference. If I expected the others to be on the 
left, I would be there too, highway patrol or no highway patrol. 24
Lewis’s point is clear. If the law prescribes a particular response to a co-
ordination problem, but that response fails to gain salience among the rele-
vant social group, the salient response trumps the law, provided that the payoff is 
high enough. (And, as Lewis notes, this may be the case even where the law 
is backed by sanctions.) The underlying lesson of these examples is that legal 
rules gain their moral force not from their legal status, per se, but from their 
status as a salient response to a social coordination problem. Many laws are, 
indeed, salient responses to coordination problems, but some laws go well be-
yond what is required for effective social coordination and others – such as the 
advertised speed limit on Thomas Street – do not track salient social norms. 
Finnis thinks there is good reason for people to respond to social coordination 
24 lewIs, D, Convention: A Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press, 1969, 44 (emphasis 
added).
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problems by regarding the law as a seamless web. However, it is far from ob-
vious that such an attitude is better suited to advance the common good than 
a more selective approach to legal obedience.
Iv. CoordInatIon wIthout authorIty
Finnis claims that the role of positive law in securing beneficial social 
coordination gives it generic authority over its subjects. I have already begun 
in the previous section to drive a wedge between these two ideas. I suggested 
above that insofar as there is an obligation to obey the law, this stems not from 
the legal status of the rule so much as its status as a salient response to a social 
coordination problem. It follows that where there is a clash between a legal 
rule and a salient social practice in a particular field of social coordination – as 
in the case of Thomas Street and Lewis’s related example – the salient social 
practice will often win out. My suggestion is therefore that, although there 
may often be an obligation to obey the law due to its coordination function, it 
does not follow from this that law has generic authority.
I take it that this conclusion is similar to Raz’s view. Finnis seeks to re-
but Raz’s position through reference to a hypothetical example. 25 He imagi-
nes that farmers on the banks of a river may not agree that there is sufficient 
reason for a national policy against river pollution. A voluntary anti-pollu-
tion campaign may not gain their support. However, Finnis contends that 
‘if and when a law is passed, things are changed for the farmer’s practical 
reasoning.’ The farmer may now reason that ‘I should comply with this law, 
even though this law is neither in the national interest nor in my own. I 
should comply because I get many benefits from [...] the legal system in 
which I live.’ 26 Finnis acknowledges that, on the face of it, this line of rea-
soning may apply just as well to a voluntary anti-pollution campaign as to a 
legal response. He argues that what sets the law apart from voluntary social 
conventions is ‘the wide range of benefits’ that it confers. 27 These include so-
cial stability and equal enforcement. However, this argument sells voluntary 
social practices short.
25 fInnIs, ‘Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament’, 49-50.
26 Ibid., 49.
27 Ibid., 50.
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Finnis’s argument that that social coordination requires ‘unanimity or 
authority’ 28 arguably overlooks the possibility of non-state forms of legal or-
dering. Various forms of consensual and customary law play an important 
practical role in coordinating social action. 29 There is reason to think that 
these forms of non-state order will often outperform the dictates of a cen-
tralised authority as a response to the complex coordination problems faced 
by modern societies. Human knowledge about social organisation is subject 
to severe limitations. This is partly because humans have limited capacity to 
acquire, store and process complex information. More importantly, however, 
it is because of the complexity and dynamism of human society. The task of 
designing social institutions involves coordinating a diverse set of human 
actors, each with their own intricate sets of nested preferences. The process 
of identifying and aggregating these preferences is therefore deeply complex. 
Mechanisms such as the price system show that consensual agreements or 
evolved social practices can sometimes capture the information needed to 
coordinate preferences on a social level more effectively than any central 
planner. 30
There is another point to be made here. One may well wonder whether 
Finnis’s understanding of legal authority is conducive to core constitutional 
values such as the rule of law and fundamental rights. I have argued elsewhere 
that social action in service of the common good is best pursued within a polit-
ical framework that contains a set of general, end-independent rules defining 
each person’s protected sphere. 31 These presumptive rules are then subject 
to positive duties to promote the interests of the poor and vulnerable. The 
precise form this balance takes will differ from community to community. It 
is likely that inefficient or unjust decisions will sometimes be made. Is it really 
desirable within this framework for citizens to adopt the farmer’s attitude that 
‘I should comply with this law, even though this law is neither in the national 
interest nor in my own’? 32 Those who think that responsible and active cit-
izens have a duty to exercise independent judgment in relation to unjust or 
unnecessary laws have reason to be troubled by Finnis’s stance on this issue.
28 fInnIs, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 2nd ed, 2011, 232.
29 Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 6.
30 See particularly hayek, F A, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, American Economic Review 35 
(1945) 519; Id., Law, Legislation and Liberty, University of Chicago Press, 1982, vol 1, ch 1-3.
31 Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 5.
32 fInnIs, ‘Law’s Authority and Social Theory’s Predicament’, 49.
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v. the duty to obey the law
I have argued that law lacks genuine authority. Finnis’s coordination ar-
gument fails to establish the moral force of law. What, then, is the closest we 
can get to vindicating the popular view that law possesses generic normative 
weight? I wish to conclude this chapter by arguing that we can make some 
sense of the notion of a generic duty to obey the law by utilising the concept of 
a prima facie duty. The idea of a prima facie duty, as I use it here, is an episte-
mological notion. If A has a prima facie duty to perform some action f, then A 
has presumptive reason to believe that A has decisive reason to f. 33 I will suggest 
that there is a weak prima facie duty to obey the law in a minimally effective 
and just legal system. This means that the fact that an action is required by 
law creates weak presumptive reason to believe that the action is rationally 
required. Law, on this view, does not possess generic moral force, but it does 
have weak epistemological salience as a guide to action.
The foundation for this view is supplied by the idea that each person 
has reason to follow salient social norms where these represent reasonable 
determinations of the common good. The common good is a state of affairs 
in which each member of the community has a reasonable range of options 
for living a fulfilling life. Each person has robust pro tanto reason to pursue 
the common good, because it is good not only for her but also for everyone 
else in the community. 34 This duty extends to following those social norms 
which give practical shape to the common good within a given community. 
Howeverr, this idea contains two important qualifications: first, the norms 
in question must be genuinely salient; and, second, they must be reasonable. 
The legal speed limit on Thomas Street fails to bind in reason because it fails 
the first of these conditions. The fact that a norm is recognised as part of the 
law in a given community therefore does not mean it will be genuinely salient 
as a determination of the common good. The legal status of a norm also pro-
vides no guarantee that it will be reasonable. Can we nonetheless say that the 
legal status of a norm holds epistemological weight in assessing whether it is 
rationally binding?
We saw earlier in this article that law often claims authority by present-
ing itself as a self-contained genre of discourse. This claim exerts pressure on 
33 For further discussion, see Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 5.
34 For a detailed argument to this effect, see ibid., ch 4.
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members of the community to accept the law as a unified system of norms. 
Suppose that law’s claim to authority is generally given at least presumptive 
weight by the members of a particular community: that is, people generally 
think they have genuine reason to follow the law. A legal order with this kind 
of minimal effectiveness will give its norms a good chance of gaining salience 
within the community. This will be, at best, a rebuttable presumption, since 
scenarios like the Thomas Street case may evidently arise even in communi-
ties where law is generally obeyed. Nonetheless, the fact that a norm holds 
legal status within the community will give people presumptive reason to be-
lieve that the norm is a salient means of social coordination.
Does the fact that a norm is part of the law give presumptive reason to 
believe that it is not only salient, but reasonable? Suppose that the law in a giv-
en community passes a minimal standard of justice: it does not, for example, 
practice systematic discrimination against vulnerable groups. It is plausible 
that many of the legal norms of such a community will be reasonable speci-
fications of the common good. The common good is open-ended: there are 
many different reasonable ways that it can be realised. Some laws will flatly 
contradict the demands of practical reason, but these rules are unlikely to be 
pervasive in a minimally just community. It is more likely that the norms of 
such a system will be unreasonable because they are arbitrary, inefficient or 
disproportionate compared to the alternative social solutions they displace. 
However, norms of this type may nonetheless be rationally binding. This is 
because the collective interest in maintaining a salient response to a coordina-
tion problem will often trump minor flaws in the relevant standards.
Suppose, for example, that the local government builds a set of traffic 
lights near your home in an inefficient location. The traffic lights have the ef-
fect of significantly slowing traffic without any commensurate gains in safety. 
There is a positive legal norm saying motorists must stop when the light turns 
red. This norm may well gain salience: if people are in the habit of obeying 
traffic signals in your community, they will probably stop at the red light most 
of the time. The norm is, however, unreasonable: it is an inefficient norm 
compared to the existing social practices at the relevant intersection. Imagine 
you are driving in your neighbourhood: the light turns red as you approach. 
What should you do? It seems that the most reasonable response in the cir-
cumstances is to stop at the red light. This is because the social interest in 
predictable traffic rules trumps the inefficiency of the norm.
Similar examples abound. Tax systems are often inefficient, arbitrary or 
distorted by special interests. Government inefficiency means many people 
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pay more tax than is justified by the demands of the common good. Does this 
mean you should stop paying taxes? Not necessarily. It is likely that the gov-
ernment carries out many functions that are important for the common good. 
It may be true that these functions would be accomplished by other social 
institutions if the state was not involved, 35 but once government enters the 
picture these institutions may be crowded out, leaving no feasible alternative. 
The importance of a salient social mode of providing important services may 
therefore trump even serious and widespread inefficiencies in the tax system. 
The likelihood of legal norms gaining salience therefore gives at least weak 
presumptive reason to believe it is reasonable to adopt them as a means of 
promoting the common good of the community.
I conclude that there is a weak prima facie duty to obey the law in a 
minimally well-functioning and just community. Legal duties are weak prima 
facie duties. This is much weaker than the common perception that law holds 
authority, in the sense of supplying exclusionary reasons to disregard extra-le-
gal considerations, but it is the closest we get to vindicating that conception. 
Each person must nonetheless exercise judgment in working out whether to 
obey specific legal norms, since there is always the possibility that the law will 
be trumped by other salient solutions. There is also the possibility, even in a 
minimally just community, that particular legal norms will be so unreasonable 
that they ought not be followed. There may be a weak prima facie duty to 
follow the law, but this does not mean we should simply assume that following 
the law is the right thing to do. The extent to which the law commands our 
obedience must ultimately be assessed on a case by case basis.
vI. the role of CoerCIon
What role does coercion play in this picture? We have seen that there 
is a weak prima facie duty to obey the law in a minimally functional and just 
legal system. The robustness of this duty, however, may vary from norm to 
norm, as well as from system to system. The presence of coercive sanctions for 
disobeying the law will generally strengthen the duty. They accomplish this in 
two distinct ways. First, sanctions may bolster the salience of legal norms by 
giving people additional incentive to follow them. Second, sanctions (perhaps 
35 See ibid., ch 6.
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counter-intuitively) may bolster the reasonableness of legal norms by making 
it more likely that their subjects will have genuine prudential or moral reasons 
to comply with them. These effects might apply to particular legal norms or 
on a wider systemic basis. They are relevant to practical reasoning at both 
epistemological and all-things-considered levels.
We saw above that the salience of a law or other social norm plays an 
important role in determining its moral force for members of the community. 
Social coordination is necessary to secure the common good. This, in turn, 
depends upon people knowing what they are required to do in order to co-
operate with others in society. People will tend to adopt those social practices 
that present themselves as salient in planning their behaviour. It follows that 
the reasonable course of action for a person who wishes to contribute effec-
tively to the common good is to seek to follow salient norms about who should 
contribute in which ways to the running of the community. Laws will often 
be salient, due to their special position of putative authority, but where they 
are not (as in the case of Thomas Street) it may be better to follow the salient 
norm than to comply with the law. Law can increase its likelihood of being 
salient by giving members of society incentives to follow it. These incentives 
might take various forms, but perhaps the most obvious one is coercive sanc-
tions.
If a particular law is backed by weighty sanctions, it gives people reason 
to believe that it will be widely followed. It also, as a matter of fact, means 
that it is more likely to be widely followed, as people seek to avoid the sanc-
tion. The presence of sanctions therefore makes a legal norm more likely to 
be salient. This, in turn, makes it not only prudent but right for community 
members to adopt it as a guide to action. The important point to note in 
this context is that sanctions do not only make law more likely to be obeyed 
because they force people to do so, by effectively pitting prudential consider-
ations against moral ones. Sanctions also give people additional moral reason 
to obey the law, because they make it more likely that the law is a salient mode 
of coordination for the common good. A law that is less just or efficient than 
competing social norms can still gain moral force if it is the salient option for 
coordinating social action. It accomplishes this, as noted previously, by crowd-
ing out superior solutions that might otherwise be generally adopted.
Sanctions, then, make legal norms more likely to be salient, potentially giv-
ing them moral force. They also make an agent’s decision to follow a legal norm 
more likely to be reasonable. The presence of coercive sanctions for breaching 
a law gives the subject both self-regarding and other-regarding reasons to obey 
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it. Most obviously, a person has reason to avoid the sanction insofar it is harmful 
for her personally. We might be disposed to regard this as a prudential reason, 
rather than a moral one. However, it is also a kind of moral reason, insofar as 
each person is properly for herself an object of moral consideration. Further-
more, a person will often have reason to avoid the sanction because it is harmful 
for others. It may harm her family (and perhaps her wider community), because 
it makes her less able to care for them and support them financially. It may harm 
her friends and loved ones, because it makes them worry about her well being. 
It may harm her work colleagues and clients, because she can no longer do her 
job. And it may harm society at large, because it imposes various kinds of costs 
on the community (for example, if she is jailed, the community may bear the 
cost of housing, clothing and feeding her). These reasons combine to make a 
compelling moral case for avoiding sanctions in many cases.
The initial impact of sanctions on practical reasoning about law will of-
ten be at an epistemological level. The initial knowledge people have about a 
particular law – or laws in their community – is likely to include the presence 
and general character of sanctions. This is likely to form part of the general 
store of social knowledge about the law. The presence of robust sanctions, for 
the reasons outlined above, supplies presumptive epistemological reason to 
believe that following the law is the right thing to do. This reinforces the rel-
atively weak epistemological reason we have to believe that the law in general 
is morally binding. It is still true that law does not possess generic normative 
authority, so whether we should obey a specific law needs to be assessed on a 
case by case basis. However, a harsh and punitive legal system where any act 
of legal disobedience is likely to attract significant sanctions produces a rela-
tively robust prima facie duty to follow the law, because there is a significant 
likelihood that the reasons associated with the sanctions will end up outweigh-
ing any countervailing moral considerations. This effect will be strongest in 
a legal system that is generally effective and just, as well as having robust 
sanctions. However, the same point may apply even to a significantly unjust 
and arbitrary legal system, provided that the sanctions are harsh enough to 
override these other factors. 36
36 There are some laws that should never be followed, no matter how harsh the sanctions might 
be. However, even in a generally unjust and arbitrary system, many of the injustices that occur 
will likely not rise to this level of gravity. The level of injustice in the law will then have to be 
weighed against the reasons for compliance generated by the sanction. 
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The availability of coercive sanctions, then, can bootstrap legal norms 
into a position of salience and reasonableness they would not otherwise hold, 
generating both epistemological and moral reasons for subjects to comply 
with them. It is tempting for legal authorities to make use of this mechanism 
in order to bolster the effectiveness of their rules. However, they should do 
so very cautiously. Legal sanctions carry a significant moral hazard, since they 
may bootstrap inefficient or unreasonable legal norms into a position of epis-
temological and moral force. Laws backed by weighty sanctions risk becoming 
salient, thereby crowding out social norms that might offer superior solutions 
to social coordination problems. They also risk becoming reasonable, putting 
subjects in a position where obeying an unjust or inefficient law is not only 
prudentially appealing, but also the morally correct thing to do. This would 
have the harmful consequence of incentivising widespread compliance with 
bad laws, but it would also impose the less obvious harm of making the sub-
jects themselves complicit in any injustice that follows from their actions. 37
vII. ConClusIon
Law plays an important role in coordinating social action in the name of 
the common good. However, this does not mean that law possesses generic 
authority. Rather, I have argued for the less ambitious claim that there is a 
weak prima facie duty to obey the positive law in a minimally effective and 
just legal system. Each person has weighty pro tanto reason to promote the 
common good; this, in turn, gives her pro tanto reason to follow social norms 
where they are salient and reasonable modes of pursuing this goal. Law is not 
guaranteed to be either salient or reasonable, meaning there is no generic ob-
ligation to obey the law because it is the law. Nonetheless, the fact that a norm 
holds positive legal status within a minimally effective and just legal system 
gives presumptive reason to believe that the norm is salient and reasonable. 
This gives rise to a weak prima facie duty to follow the law.
The presence of strong and consistent coercive sanctions makes a po-
tentially important difference to the picture presented above. Sanctions 
make laws more likely to be salient, by increasing the likelihood that people 
37 For discussion of the harms that moral agents suffer from being complicit in wrongdoing, see 
Crowe, Natural Law and the Nature of Law, ch 3.
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will follow them. They also make following the law more likely to be rea-
sonable, by generating both prudential and moral reasons for compliance. 
The prima facie duty to obey the law is therefore more robust in relation 
to a law or legal system where sanctions play a prominent role. This might 
appear, superficially, to be a merit of such systems, but in fact it comes at a 
significant moral cost. Sanctions potentially mean that even unjust, arbitrary 
or inefficient laws can become morally binding. This not only decreases the 
scope for right-minded citizens to resist the laws (both in practice and as 
a matter of moral principle), but also makes them potentially complicit in 
wrongdoing.
This article has not sought to provide a general theory of when sanctions 
should (or should not) be used to encourage legal compliance. Rather, I have 
sought to highlight some factors that are relevant to this question, by discuss-
ing the relationship of sanctions to the prima facie duty to obey the law. I am 
disposed to think that legal sanctions should be used sparingly, because law 
can generally coordinate social action pretty well without them. 38 However, 
my point in this article is a more modest one: whatever the proper role of 
sanctions might be, they should be deployed in a way that is attentive to their 
consequences for legal obligation and, more broadly, the social project of pro-
moting the common good. This involves understanding, first, why sanctions 
are tempting for rulers – due not just to their practical utility, but also their 
moral impact on subjects – and, second, why this temptation needs to be bal-
anced carefully against the moral hazards such measures pose.
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